Military politics and democracy in the Andes Maiah Jaskoski.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Military mission performance in Latin America -- The problem -- Challenges to security and democratic civil-military relations in the andes -- Explaining military mission performance in democratic Latin America -- Case selection: a focus on the army in Peru and Ecuador -- The data -- Overview of the analysis -- The context: civil-military relations in democratic Peru and Ecuador -- High constraints on Peru's military -- Low constraints on Ecuador's military -- Post-transition army mission performance in Peru and Ecuador, 1980s-90s -- Putting sovereignty before policing -- Deviations: contradictions in missions and sovereignty neglect -- Alternative explanations -- Mission constraint and neglect of counterinsurgency: Peru since 2000 -- Staying in the barracks -- Restrictions on army autonomy -- Mission overload and neglect of border defense: Ecuador since 2000 -- Neglecting a porous border while policing the interior -- Overwhelming security responsibilities -- Battalions for hire: private army contracts in Peru and Ecuador -- Pressures from the top -- Local client influence -- Limits to client influence -- Comparative perspectives on military mission performance -- Colombia: tolerance of policing amid ongoing insurgency -- Venezuela: mission loss, organizational trauma, and narrow mission beliefs -- Bolivia: broad mission beliefs despite trauma -- Extreme executive control: recent trends in Venezuela and Bolivia-- Reflections on assigning militaries police work -- Appendix A. Research methodology.